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Dispute,	what	dispute?		
An	examination	of	the	independent	certification	processes	of	a	
construction	contract	
 
Michelle Backstrom  
Construction contracts often provide that the decision of an independent certifier is final and 
binding. The effect of a contractual term like this has been debated in the courts over time. 
This paper considers the binding nature of certificates in the context of traditional 
construction contract arrangements and also considers the implications for more complex 
contracts like those entered into to facilitate public private partnerships. This paper 
considers the response of the courts and the drafting implications and argues that a different 
focus would be advantageous.  
 
1. Introduction 
A common feature of contracts for major construction and infrastructure projects is the role third parties 
have in the administration of various technical and commercial issues arising in the relationship between 
owner and builder.  Whether as independent contractor or owner’s employee, these third parties are 
variously described as “engineer”, “architect”, “superintendent” or “independent verifier / certifier”.  In 
this role, the parties commonly agree in their contract to allow this third party to do such things as: 
 Determine the payments due to the contractor from time to time and whether and by how much 
the contract sum ought be adjusted because of events which have occurred; 
 Assess the effect of delay events on the agreed programme and grant or withhold extensions of 
time to that programme as it determines is required by the terms of the contract; 
 Consider the appropriateness of the contractor’s design and allow its use in the construction of the 
project; or 
 Determine whether the project has passed performance hurdles specified by the contract and 
therefore reached completion (thereby ending the accumulation of liquidated damages should the 
contractor be in delay, allowing subsequent use and the transfer of risk of damage to the owner). 
                                                            
 Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology. 
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This third party therefore has considerable influence over the operation of significant features of the 
contract.  Decisions made can impact monthly cash flow to the contractor, affect decisions made as to 
what manpower should be allocated to improve the project’s progress and even the extent (and hence the 
cost) of work necessary to be undertaken for the project.   
With this important role comes the possibility that one of the parties to the contract may be aggrieved by a 
decision made by the third party and seek to dispute it.    The contractor may believe the cost of the extra 
project features imposed by the independent design verifier is not required to achieve the performance 
required by the contract.  The owner may believe an extension of time for completion the superintendent 
has allowed is not warranted by the circumstances, depriving the owner of valuable production or the 
delay liquidated damages equivalent. 
The question whether the decisions of the third party are final and binding may arise in the context of a 
construction contract where the certifier is appointed by the owner and has no contractual relationship 
with the contractor. Alternatively, it may arise in the case of those transactions (including public private 
partnerships) where the certifier enters into a deed with both the owner (or proponent1) and contractor and 
the deed purports to regulate the relationship of the certifier with the parties.  
This paper considers the circumstances when the decisions of a certifier can be disputed and a certificate 
challenged. Consideration is given to the circumstances where the certifier is appointed by the owner and 
also those situations where the certifier enters into a deed with both the owner and contractor. Given the 
practical difficulties and uncertainty created by the current law, this paper argues that a different approach 
is required. The paper also considers the implications for the drafting of construction contracts to 
overcome uncertainty posed by the current law: uncertainty which is driven by the increasingly complex 
nature of the role of the certifier under some construction contracts.  
2. The validity of the certification process 
Over the years attempts have been made to challenge the fundamental validity of the process of contract 
certification in the case where the contract provides the certificate is not subject to review. The aim has 
been to dispose of such a certificate by arguing the process itself infringes fundamental doctrines of the 
common law. This has been done by using two different arguments, both of which have to date been 
unsuccessful. Firstly, that a contract term that provides for a conclusive certification process offends 
public policy because it ousts the jurisdiction of the court. Secondly, where the certifier making the 
                                                            
1 In this paper the word “Owner” is used to refer to both the Owner and/or the Proponent in a public private 
partnership. 
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decision is one of the parties or an agent of one of the parties, an argument has been raised that the 
contract is uncertain. Each argument will now be considered. 
2.1 Public policy 
We know that a contract which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts is contrary to public policy.2 The 
argument raised in the courts is that a clause giving a third party the power to make a decision which is 
final and binding on the parties to the contract offends this principle because it attempts to substitute the 
court’s judgment with a decision of the third party. In Dobbs v The National Bank of Australasia Ltd 
Australia,3 the High Court considered when the principle is offended. The question before the court 
involved the validity of a clause in a guarantee which purported to fix a guarantor’s liability by reference 
to a certificate. The clause provided that the certificate of the manager or acting manager of the bank was 
conclusive evidence of the customer’s indebtedness. It was argued that this was an attempt to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court.  
The court found the certificate was conclusive and distinguished between negative provisions which 
restrict the right to take action in the courts which are invalid and positive provisions which give effect to 
a decision made by a designated person. The court found in the latter case the contract does not oust the 
jurisdiction of the court. It found that there is no cause of action accrued until a person who has the task of 
arbitrating the dispute or exercising their discretion has actually done that. 4 In the same case, Starke J 
said:  
In none of these cases is the jurisdiction of the court ousted: all that has been done or attempted is 
to provide for the ascertainment of rights or facts by the parties or by some agreed person or 
tribunal, and to leave the enforcement of the parties' rights so ascertained or flowing from the 
facts so found to the determination of the Courts of law. 
Here, the certificate could not be challenged. The court found the rule does not stop parties “giving a 
contractual conclusiveness to a third person's certificate of some matter upon which their rights and 
obligations may depend.”5 Provided the certifier is acting within the terms of the contract, a provision 
making the decision final and binding does not oust the jurisdiction of the court and is not an argument 
that can be used to attack the validity of a certificate. 
                                                            
2 Dobbs v The National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643. 
3 (1935) 53 CLR 643. Also see, South Australian Railways Commissioner v Egan (1973) 47 ALJR 140; Jones v 
Sherwood Computer Services plc [1992] 1 WLR 277. 
4 Dobbs v The National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643, 652. 
5 Dobbs v The National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643, 654. 
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2.2 Certainty issues 
It is not unusual for the parties to a contract to leave matters to be determined by a third party, for 
example, to determine the rent under a lease or payments, delays and entitlement to extra costs under a 
construction contract. 6 However, the certifier is often not independent of the owner and the parties 
sometimes agree that important matters may be determined by the owner or the owner’s employee.7 
Whether this makes the contract uncertain is a matter of construction8  for  a contract that leaves essential 
matters for later determination by one of the parties is unenforceable9 but a term that merely gives a 
discretion to one of the parties as to the method of performance of a contractual obligation is enforceable.  
In WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd,10 (WMC) Ipp J considered a dispute in relation to 
a valuation made by the owner of a mine in respect of variations to the works completed by the 
contractor. The contract provided that the variation valuation, in the absence of agreement, could be made 
by the owner “in its sole discretion”. Ipp J dismissed the possibility of an argument that such a term was 
void for uncertainty. A submission on these grounds his Honour says “would be untenable” and confirms 
that “any uncertainty would be cured by the implication of terms requiring the appellant to value by 
reference to objective criteria”. The term to be implied is to “act honestly, bona fide and reasonably”. 11 
While no argument was available that the process itself was an invalid process, this does not answer the 
question whether a certificate once issued may be challenged nor with the question of the remedies 
available (if any) to the parties if a mistake is made and a certificate issued in error. The approach of the 
courts to the interpretation of contracts and the question whether a certificate is final and binding will now 
be considered.  
3. The review of the decision of a certifier – interpreting the terms of the contract 
In order to seek review of a decision of a certifier it will be necessary to establish a dispute under the 
contract. A contract dispute may arise when the contract has not been performed in accordance with its 
terms. If established, an innocent party would seek a remedy for breach of contract. To ascertain whether 
                                                            
6 For example, Legal and General Life of Australia v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314; Hawker Noyes Pty 
Ltd v New South Wales Egg Corporation  (Unreported , NSWSC, 14077 of 1988, 11 November 1988); Atlantic 
Civil Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation (1992) 39 NSWLR 468. 
7 For example, see Ranger v Great Western Railway Company (1854) 5 HLC 72, 88; Minister Trust Ltd v Traps 
Tractors Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 963, 973; WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 
501. 
8 For example, see Re Theodorou [1993] 1Qd R 588, 592-593; Yaroomba Beach Development Company Pty Ltd v 
Coeur De Lion Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 398. 
9 But see Godecke v Kirwan (1973) 129 CLR 629 where a contract allowing the vendor’s solicitor to insert further 
terms was binding. 
10 (1999) 20 WAR 489. 
11 (1999) 20 WAR 489, 501 [46]. 
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review might be possible, it is necessary to consider the terms of the contract and whether the contract has 
been performed in accordance with those terms. It will be important to determine whether a dispute has 
arisen and if so, with whom - the owner, contractor and/or certifier. 
Third party assessments might be treated as final and binding or interim only and subject to review. For 
example, interim certificates may be issued certifying the value of work done from time to time under the 
contract. Such certificates are commonly regarded as being “provisional estimates of the sum to which the 
contractor is entitled by way of instalment payments”12 and any error is subject to correction in the next 
certificate.13 Final certificates often certify the sum due to the contractor and/or confirm that the work 
conforms to the contract.14 Is a certificate issued in these circumstances subject to review? It is clearly 
factual evidence the certifier is satisfied.15 Views about when decisions are final and binding have 
changed over time.  
The meaning of the term “final and binding” and when the court is likely to find that the parties to the 
contract intended the certificate to be immune from challenge will be considered now. 
  3.1 Express provision that the decision is final and binding  
If the effect of the certificate is either expressed in the contract to be final and binding or the exercise of 
discretion and the decision is made honestly, independently and in accordance with the contract then there 
can be no dispute. But if the presumed intention is to arrive at an objective assessment not expressed to be 
final and binding it will be possible for an aggrieved party in appropriate circumstances to claim the 
contract has not been performed as it should and seek a remedy. So what are the factors to look for to 
determine which category the certificate falls within? 
Keating defines a certificate as binding and conclusive “if there is no possibility of an appeal on its merit, 
in any proceedings against the matters determined in that certificate.”16 If a contract expressly provides 
that the decision of the certifier is to be “final and binding” then the intention of the parties as expressed 
will be enforced and the decision will not be reviewed.17 In Legal and General Life of Australia v A 
Hudson Pty Ltd 18 this question was considered in relation to a valuation of the rent to be paid under a 
lease. The lessee submitted the valuer was in error by including a removed mezzanine level in its 
                                                            
12 Henry Boot Construction Ltd v Alstom Combined Cycles Ltd  [2005] 1 WLR 3850, 3870. 
13 Rupert Morgan Building Services Ltd v Jervis [2004] 1 WLR 1867, 1870. 
14Stephen Furst and Vivian Ramsey, Keating on Construction Contracts, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2006) 141. 
15 National Coal Board v William Neill & Sons Ltd [1985] QB 300. 
16 Stephen Furst and Vivian Ramsey above n14, 148. 
17 Legal and General Life of Australia v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314. 
18 (1985) 1 NSWLR 314. 
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calculation of lettable area. The lease provided that the decision of the valuer was to be “final and 
binding”. McHugh JA states: 
By referring the decision to a valuer, the parties agree to accept his honest and impartial decision 
as to the appropriate amount of the valuation. They rely on his skill and judgment and agree to be 
bound by his decision. It is now settled that an action for damages for negligence will lie against a 
valuer to whom the parties have referred the question of valuation if one of them suffers loss as 
the result of his negligent valuation: Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727; Arenson v 
Arenson [1977] AC 405. But as between the parties to the main agreement the valuation can stand 
even though it was made negligently. While mistake or error on the part of the valuer is not by 
itself sufficient to invalidate the decision or the certificate of valuation, nevertheless, the mistake 
may be of a kind which shows that the valuation is not in accordance with the contract. A mistake 
concerning the identity of the premises to be valued could seldom, if ever, comply with the terms 
of the agreement between the parties. But a valuation which is the result of the mistaken 
application of the principles of valuation may still be made in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. In each case the critical question must always be: Was the valuation made in 
accordance with the terms of a contract? If it is, it is nothing to the point that the valuation may 
have proceeded on the basis of error or that it constitutes a gross over or under value. Nor is it 
relevant that the valuer has taken into consideration matters which he should not have taken into 
account or has failed to take into account matters which he should have taken into account. The 
question is not whether there is an error in the discretionary judgment of the valuer. It is whether 
the valuation complies with the terms of the contract.19 [Emphasis added] 
One difficulty noted with this approach and raised by Trevor Thomas20 is that McHugh JA’s statement is 
based on the premise that the decision will be honest and impartial. The question of impartiality is 
obviously a difficult one where the decision maker is one of the parties or an agent of one of the parties – 
a scenario which often arises under a building contract. The consequences are enormous though, for if the 
certifier fails to act independently, the decision may be set aside.21 
Provided there is no fraud or collusion, the assessment required to determine if a certificate may be set 
aside then is one of whether the decision complies with the terms of the contract. The third party is not 
                                                            
19 (1985) 1 NSWLR 314, 336-7. Also see, Holt v Cox (1994) 15 ACSR 313, Woolworths Ltd v Merost Pty Ltd 
(1988) 14 NSWLR 300, 303; Karenlee Nominees Pty Ltd v Gollin & Co Ltd [1983] 1 VR 657. 
20 Trevor Thomas, ‘The value is whatever I say it is: Determinations by the owner under construction contracts’ 
(2009) 25 BCL 246, 248. 
21 Perini v Commonwealth of Australia [1969] 2 NSWLR 530. 
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acting as an arbitrator and is not obliged to hear the contentions of the parties but is making a decision 
based on the knowledge and expertise they have as an expert in the field. 22 If the decision complies with 
the terms of the contract then any mistake made will not be relevant.23 Whether it is in accordance with 
the contract can be a difficult question resolved by considering the type and magnitude of the mistake. 
Santow J in Holt v Cox24 noted that there is a reluctance to interfere “because the courts have no greater 
expertise than expert valuers; and that where parties have chosen voluntarily to commit the determination 
of valuation to an expert, judicial restraint is an appropriate response.” Of course the expert who gets it 
wrong may be liable in negligence.25 This is one of the policy reasons behind the current position denying 
the right to review in the case of mistake. 
Santow J continued: 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that there are limits to the types of error which will be overlooked in 
the courts, even in the most robust statements of the modern position. As Sir Frederick Jordan once 
reminded us, “there are mistakes and mistakes”: Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council 
(1947) 47 SR (NSW) 416 at 420. Especially where, as here, the valuer exposes his or her reasoning 
process, then the ultimate issue for judicial determination remains that of deciding whether the 
valuation was in accordance with the parties’ contract.  
A mistake in process will not vitiate the decision whereas a mistake rendering the decision one that is not 
in accordance with the terms of the contract will. Where there is a mistake in process the claim will need 
to be framed as a claim for damages in contract or tort against the expert. There may however be no 
contract between the contractor and certifier; the certifier having been appointed by the owner to oversee 
the contract. The owner may have a claim for breach of contract against the certifier who will be liable in 
damages for any loss suffered by the owner,26 and liability may also attach in negligence. 27 The 
contractor in this situation may however be in a precarious position. In Australia in John Holland 
Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd v Majorca Projects Pty Ltd28  the court found in the situation 
before it, it was inappropriate to impose a duty in negligence on the architect in favour of the builder. A 
factor considered by the court in coming to this view was the inclusion of a dispute resolution provision 
                                                            
22 Capricorn Inks Pty Ltd v Lawter International (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 8. 
23  Whether the outcome of any dispute may also depend on the relief sought is an open question given that a claim 
for specific performance may be refused in appropriate circumstances: see Marcus S Jacobs QC ‘Impugning expert 
determinations in Australia’ (2000) 74 ALJ 858, 861 – 862. 
24 (1997) 23 ACSR 590, 596 - 7. 
25 Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727.  
26 Harmer  v Cornelius (1885) 5 CB (NS) 236, 246; Jones v Manchester Corp [1952] 2 QB 852, 876. 
27 Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727. 
28(1996) 13 BCL 235. 
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in the building contract allowing the opening up and review of the architect’s decisions. It could not 
therefore be said that “reliance” necessary to establish a duty of care had been placed on the architect’s 
certificate. This approach has been common.29 There may be no duty of care present as required to 
establish the claim in the tort of negligence and no claim available in contract. 
 If there is a contractual relationship between the owner, contractor and certifier (as is commonly the case 
in the construction undertaken as a public private partnership) then the owner and/or contractor may be in 
the position where they cannot challenge a “wrong” decision because it is final and binding and cannot 
obtain substantial damages from the certifier whose mistake may have caused either of them loss because 
of the existence of a limitation of liability provision in favour of the certifier. As a result it is imperative 
to pay careful attention when negotiating the terms of the contract, to the nature of the decision of the 
certifier (that is, whether it can be challenged) and the existence of any limitation of liability provision in 
favour of the certifier.   
3.2 No express provision that the decision is final and binding 
If there is no express provision that the decision of the third party is final and binding, complex 
interpretation issues can arise. Much of the difficulty experienced in this area can be traced to the decision 
of the English Court of Appeal in Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction Co. 
Limited.30 While this decision has been overruled, there is still much uncertainty surrounding the 
interpretation of contractual provisions dealing with certificates. Recent discussion in Australia has 
focused on ascertaining whether the certifier is exercising discretion and as a result making a decision 
which cannot be challenged. Where the assessment by the certifier can be identified as a mechanical 
exercise then the cases suggest the decision will be subject to review. Arguably though, the true test has 
been high jacked by this focus on the discretionary or mechanical debate which has been shown to be a 
highly technical analysis (or even perhaps too simplistic) in more complex contracts. The major cases will 
now be considered in order to  identify the approach to use to ascertain whether the decision of the 
certifier can be challenged in the courts where the contract does not say either way.  
Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction Co. Limited   
                                                            
29 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 
ACTEW Corporation Ltd v Mihaljevic [2011] ACTSC 23. 
30 [1984] 2 All ER 175. The case has been the subject of comment in a number of publications. For example, see  
Thomas, n 20, 248; Ian Duncan Wallace, ‘In its sole discretion: An Unpersuasive Interpretation?’ (2000) 16 BCL 
243; Adrian Baron, ‘WMC Resources: A persuasive Interpretation Based on What Courts are Asked to Do’ (2001) 
17 BCL 103. 
10 
 
In Northern Regional Health Authority v Derek Crouch Construction Co. Limited (“Crouch”) 31 the court 
considered whether it had power to challenge the certificate of an architect under a standard form 
contract. It was decided that the court could not substitute its decision for the decision of the architect as 
there was no express provision in the contract giving the court the power to review that decision. Browne-
Wilkinson LJ said32  
In principle, in an action based on contract the Court can only enforce the agreement between the 
parties: it has no power to modify that agreement in any way. Therefore, if the parties have 
agreed on a specified machinery for establishing their obligations, the Court cannot substitute a 
different machinery. 
 The arbitrator was thought to be in a different position because the arbitrator was commonly given 
express contractual powers to “open up review and revise” architect’s certificates.  The court was given 
no express power to do the same. The parties were bound by their agreement to rely on the decision of the 
certifier and there was effectively no dispute for the court to adjudicate.  
This reasoning is flawed as the court in this case should have investigated whether the parties had 
intended that the architect's decision was to be regarded as final rather than simply focusing on the power 
of the arbitrator. The argument was that the arbitrator would not need the power to review unless 
certificates were final and binding. While the contract provided the arbitrator had power to “open up 
review and revise”, this was a power that was required only once it was established that the certificates 
were binding. If the parties intended the certificates to operate in the interim then by their very nature they 
could be reviewed. A court would not require express power in order to review an interim certificate.33  
Despite the difficulties of this approach, the construction industry moved on and for almost fifteen years 
the decision in Crouch was accepted.34 As a result it was not unusual for the court to grant summary 
judgment to a contractor when a certificate was presented.35 The sum expressed in the certificate was 
treated as a debt due and owing and could not be challenged. This was done on the basis that the parties 
                                                            
31 [1984] 2 All ER 175. 
32 [1984] 2 All ER 175,186.  
33 For example, see the discussion of members of the court in Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert-Ash NI Ltd 
and another [1999] 1 AC 266, 270, 278, 289.  
34 For example, see Tubeworkers Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1985) 1 Const LJ 385; Turner & Goudy v 
McConnell [1985] 1 WLR 898;  Crestar Ltd v Carr (1987) 3 Const LJ 287; Lord Mayor and Citizens of the City of 
Westminster v Clifford Culpin and Partners (1988) 4 Const LJ 141; JF Finnegan Ltd v Sheffield City Council (1988) 
5 Const LJ 54, 57; Ashville Investments Ltd v Elmer Contractors Ltd [1989] 1 QB 488, 495;  Ethiopian Oil Seeds 
and Pulses Export Corporation v Rio Del Mar Foods Inc [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 86, 93. In Australia, see for example, 
Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1988) 17 FCR 487. 
35 For example, see Grahame Allen Earthmoving Pty Ltd v. Woodwark Bay Development Corporation Ltd 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Dowsett J, 15 December 1989).  
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agreed that the granting of the certificate established the obligation to pay and the court could not 
substitute different machinery for determining the obligations of the parties. In this case there was no 
dispute between the parties and the arbitration provision was not activated. The court was simply 
enforcing the agreement of the parties.  
Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert-Ash NI Ltd and another36  
Subsequently though, the dicta from Crouch noted above were found to be “obiter and wrong” in the 
House of Lords decision of Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert-Ash NI Ltd and another 
(“Beaufort”).37 Beaufort involved both interim and final certificates but only the final certificate was 
expressed to be final and binding. There was an arbitration clause with open up and review powers. The 
House of Lords concluded that the parties' agreement was that only the final certificate was conclusive 
and that all other certificates ought to be reviewable. The House of Lords expressly acknowledged that 
the parties were free to contract to make the decisions or opinions of the architect binding and 
conclusive.38 
The court found the absence of a second-tier review process in the contract did not mean the decisions of 
the certifier were binding.  The vital question the Court said is “whether upon the true construction of the 
contract, such certificates are binding? Unless they are, there is no need for a special second tier 
arrangement.”39 This is because the court retains the power to review. 
Similar issues appeared to arise in Australia in WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd 
(WMC).40 The approach of the court in WMC will now be considered to ascertain any differences from the 
approach of the House of Lords. 
WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd 
In Australia, the position has arguably been clouded by WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty 
Ltd. 41 WMC involved a valuation of variation issue. Failing agreement WMC, the owner of a mine was 
given the power to value the variation “in its sole discretion”. The question arose, was this assessment 
"final and binding"? WMC said it was because it had exercised a discretion which could not be 
challenged.  The lower court rejected this, but the appeal court agreed that the power exercised was 
                                                            
36 [1999] 1 AC 266. 
37 [1999] 1 AC 266, 281. 
38 [1999] 1 AC 266, 273.  
39 [1999] 1 AC 266, 273. 
40 (1999) 20 WAR 489 discussed above in section 2.2. 
41 (1999) 20 WAR 489. 
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discretion and could not be challenged. The court confirms the appropriate question to ask is “what was 
agreed by the contract?”42 yet the focus of the decision is on the absence of objective criteria to be applied 
by the valuer. In considering whether a decision is subject to review, the reasoning in this case and more 
generally in cases decided in Australia has focused on the nature of the decision making process;43 that is, 
whether the decision making process involved a calculation of a mechanical kind or involved 
discretionary judgement. The focus seems to be on what the person making the decision is doing. When 
ascertaining whether a discretionary judgement has been made, it is necessary to consider whether the 
contract provides objective criteria regulating how the certifier is to make an assessment. If so, then the 
process it is said is a mechanical exercise.44 In this case, if the certifier is wrong, the valuation is in breach 
of the contract and the decision may be set aside.45 Alternatively, if the judgement made by the certifier 
requires the exercise of discretion, provided the decision is made in accordance with the contract, it will 
be enforceable.46 In this situation the certifier is neither right nor wrong and a mistake by the certifier is 
unlikely to bring the decision into question or give rise to a right to have the certificate set aside. Case law 
suggests this is likely to be the case in the absence of an express provision that the decision is “final and 
binding”. 47  
Given the importance of the distinction between a decision based on objective criteria and discretionary 
judgment, what are the factors the court takes into account when determining the nature of the decision 
making process in issue? If the decision involves a simple calculation it will be non-discretionary. If 
however the decision is a complicated one or “value judgement”48 it will amount to an exercise of 
discretion.49 In Yarraman Pine Pty Ltd v Forestry Plantations Queensland McMurdo P reasoned that 
because the chief executive’s decision was “not a mathematical calculation” nor was it “limited to one 
                                                            
42 (1999) 20 WAR 489, 502 [47].  
43 The position appears to be different in England: see Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert-Ash NI Ltd and 
another [198] 2 All ER 778. For further discussion see, Thomas, n 20. Also see Baron, n 30. 
44 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 494 [16]. 
45 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 494 - 6 [17]-[18]; Neale v Richardson 
(1938) 1 All ER 753; Brodie v Cardiff Corporation (1919) AC 337; cf Modern Engineering v Gilbert- Ash Ltd 
(1974) AC 689. Also see Hawker Noyes Pty Ltd v New South Wales Egg Corporation (Unreported , Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Brownie J, 11 November 1988); Atlantic Civil Pty Ltd v Water Administration 
Ministerial Corporation (1992) 39 NSWLR 468. 
46 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 499 [34] – [37]; Legal and General 
Life of Australia Ltd v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314. Also see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St 
Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 336.  
47 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 500 [40] – [41]. 
48 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helen’s Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 336, 381.  
49 Also see the discussion in Thomas, n 20, 249 - 250 where the authorities are explored. Also note the criticism of 
the distinction in Duncan Wallace, n 30. 
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absolute value” it amounted to exercise of discretion and was not reviewable.50 The focus there was 
clearly on analysing what the certifier did. 
There are difficulties with a test of this nature; the obvious being certainty. Complex construction 
contracts have the certifier deciding many different matters. Assessing whether the duty involves an 
objective assessment or the exercise of discretion is not necessarily straight forward. For example, if the 
certifier has the power to look forward to determine if the project is going to finish on time, is this 
discretionary or mechanical? The uncertainty is exemplified by the cases referred to in WMC itself. In 
WMC, Ipp J cites a series of cases some involving discretionary judgement and others where the court 
found the action was a mechanical exercise.51 If we take the example of Hawker Noyes Pty Ltd v New 
South Wales Egg Corporation52 the certifier was required, in the absence of agreement, to ascertain a 
price he considered reasonable. The court here found that this was a mechanical exercise. In WMC the 
contract provided that the variation valuation, in the absence of agreement, could be made by the owner 
“in its sole discretion”. Ipp J dismissed the possibility of an argument that such a term was void for 
uncertainty because “any uncertainty would be cured by the implication of terms requiring the appellant 
to value by reference to objective criteria”. The term to be implied is to “act honestly, bona fide and 
reasonably”. It is hard to understand how given the implication of such a term there could be a difference 
in outcome. Yet in Hawker Noyes, the certifier’s decision was reviewable but in WMC it was not. If the 
certifier is required to act reasonably, then it would seem this necessarily implies an objective assessment 
is required although “reasonable minds acting on a properly informed basis and in a rational way may 
differ as to what is, in either case, reasonable.”53 
Drawing a line between discretion and objective assessment may be achieved in simple arrangements but 
in more complex contractual arrangements under construction contracts this is a difficult approach and a 
different assessment should be made. Rather than focusing on whether the decision may be labelled the 
exercise of discretion, the better approach would be to simply ask the question whether the decision is in 
accordance with the contract. This would focus the attention more broadly on an analysis of the parties’ 
intention expressed in the contract, its terms and whether the decision complies with them. If the decision 
is in accordance with the terms of the contract, the conclusion would be there is no breach of contract, no 
dispute as defined above and the certificate would not be subject to challenge. 
                                                            
50 [2009] QCA 102 [43]. 
51 WMC Resources Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1999) 20 WAR 489, 494 – 7. 
52 (Unreported , Supreme Court of New South Wales, Brownie J, 11 November 1988). 
53 Walton Construction Pty Ltd v Illawarra Hotel Company Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 118. 
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Contracts are interpreted using an objective approach but the “outcome of interpretation litigation is 
notoriously difficult to predict”.54 If the terms of the contract are unambiguous, the court will interpret the 
words giving them their plain meaning and will not give the terms a different meaning even when that 
may have been the intention of the parties.55 The message for the parties to the contract at present is to be 
very careful to appreciate that if a court interprets the power of the expert as the exercise of discretion, 
you are unlikely to be able to challenge the decision. While this is correct, it is not helpful in an analysis 
of how disputes should be resolved when a third party or agent of the owner is in the position of having to 
determine the parties’ rights (for example the value of work or the status of completion). To overcome the 
uncertainty of the current approach, the parties should ensure that the contract includes an express term 
which has been drafted clearly and precisely to reflect whether the decision is final and binding. This is 
particularly important given the limited recourse that may be available against a certifier who acts 
negligently.56 
In Queensland a further uncertainty arises as a result of the Property Law Act 1974 s57 which seems to 
suggest that under Queensland law, certificates are subject to review because they are construed only as 
prima facie evidence of the fact in the certificate. Section 57 provides that:  
(1)   Subject to any other Act, a provision in a contract or instrument to the effect that a certificate, 
statement or opinion of any person shall be or be received as conclusive evidence of any fact in 
the certificate, statement or opinion contained shall be construed to mean only that such 
certificate, statement or opinion shall be or be received as prima facie evidence of that fact. 
(2)  This section shall not apply to— 
(a) a certificate, statement  or opinion of a person who, in making the certificate or 
statement or in forming the opinion, is bound to act judicially or quasi-judicially or as arbitrator 
or quasi-arbitrator; or  
(b) a provision agreed to after a dispute has arisen as to the relevant fact. 
 (3) This section applies to a contract made or instrument executed after but not before the 
commencement of this Act, and shall have effect despite any stipulation to the contrary. 
(4) In this section fact includes any matter, thing, event, circumstance or state of affairs. 
                                                            
54David McLauchlan, ‘Contract Interpretation: What Is It About?’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 5, 6. 
55For example, see Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 604; Codelfa 
Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
56 For example, see John Holland Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd v Majorca Projects Pty Ltd (1996) 13 BCL 
235. Also, a certifier may well have the benefit of a limitation of liability provision. 
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While s57 makes conclusive certificates reviewable, it does not apply to “quasi-arbitrators”.57 The 
question arises whether a certifier under a construction contract is a “quasi-arbitrator” for the purpose of s 
57. In February 1973, the Queensland Law Reform Commission released its report comprising a draft Bill 
and commentary in relation to reform of Property Law in Queensland. The commentary explains the 
reasons for enacting what is now s57 and the main problem it seeks to overcome appears to be the effect 
of certificates of the kind given in relation to mortgages referred to in Dobbs v The National Bank of 
Australasia Ltd 58  discussed above in section 2.1.  It is clear from the report that it was certainly the 
intention of the Law Reform Commission that s 57 should not apply to certain certificates under building 
and engineering contracts.59 The report refers to contract provisions which make the final certificate in 
relation to work and payment conclusive and says: 
To allow conclusive effect to such a provision is much less objectionable because the architect or 
engineer in such a case is under a duty to act as an arbitrator or quasi-arbitrator in forming his 
opinion and this requires that he act fairly towards both parties.60  
While it was subsequently decided in the House of Lords in Sutcliffe v Thakrah61 that it was not 
appropriate to refer to an architect or engineer in this way, the use of the term “quasi-arbitrator” at the 
time of the drafting of this legislation was intended to refer to a certificate given in such circumstances.62 
The authors of Property Law and Practice in Queensland  explain: 
However, the House of Lords [in Sutcliffe v Thakrah] was not dealing with the conclusiveness of 
certificates, but the liability of the architect or engineer for negligence in the giving of a 
certificate, and it is submitted in the context of the conclusiveness of certificates the courts will 
have regard to the purpose expressed by the Law Reform Commission and will regard the term 
quasi-arbitrator as including the architect or engineer (by parity of reasoning it will also include a 
valuer when the valuer is under a duty to act independently and fairly towards the parties but is 
not strictly an arbitrator even though the term is not entirely apt). [footnotes deleted] 
                                                            
57 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s57 (2)(a). 
58 (1935) 53 CLR 643.  
59 QLRC 16, 49. 
60 WD Duncan, R J Vann, A E Wallace, Chris Boge, Lawbook Co, Property Law and Practice in Queensland (at 30 
November 2012) [6.1430]. 
61 [1974] AC 405. 
62 Duncan, Vann, Wallace, and Boge, n 60. 
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If this approach is adopted in Queensland, the question whether a certificate is conclusive or subject to 
review will not be impacted by s57 but will be resolved using the common law approach. Legislative 
intervention by the Queensland Parliament is required to overcome any uncertainty with the application of 
this provision. 
4. Public Private Partnerships 
 
In large infrastructure projects conducted in partnership between the public sector and the private sector 
(‘public private partnerships’)63 the independent certifier is usually engaged by both the proponent and 
contractor who enters into the certifier deed with them both. In that deed, the certifier promises to 
undertake its obligations under the project construction contract entered into between the proponent and 
the contractor dealing with the building work for the project. The certifier deed regulates the relationship 
the certifier has with the parties to the construction contract and covers such matters as the role of the 
independent certifier and the project parties, insurance matters and termination. What is interesting is 
what impact (if any) this contract structure has on the ability of the proponent or contractor to challenge a 
decision made by the certifier under the construction contract.  
 
The certifier deed which includes the scope of the certifier’s work will include a variety of duties, 
including the duty of the certifier to arrive at a fair measure of value as contemplated by the construction 
contract and a dispute resolution provision to deal with any disputes arising under it. The certifier deed 
also typically includes a provision which limits the liability of the certifier. The dispute resolution 
provision is likely to be drafted widely, to the point where it could extend to cover the certifier’s actions 
under the main building contract. As the independent certifier deed is likely to impose greater and more 
specific obligations on the certifier when making its decisions compared to the obligations that are 
imposed under the common law, the circumstances giving rise to a dispute are potentially wider under the 
certifier deed. As the duty of care absent in Majorca Projects is likely to be established under the new 
arrangement, there are potentially two avenues for that dispute – under the certifier deed or under the 
main construction contract. What, if anything, would that mean for the classes of conclusive or 
reviewable decisions? 
 
If the certifier arrives at a decision under the construction contract that is intended to be conclusive under 
that contract but is not, for example, a fair measure of value there may be a breach of the certifier deed 
and the certifier may be liable for that lapse. If the liability of the certifier under the certifier deed is 
                                                            
63 For a discussion of the public private partnership model in Australia see Professor Doug Jones, ‘Evaluating what 
is new in the PPP pipeline’ (2003) 19 BCL 250. 
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limited to the point where the remedy is insufficient then it is foreseeable that a contractor may seek to 
argue that a further consequence ought to be that the breach of the certifier deed makes the decision made 
under the construction contract less binding than it might otherwise have been. That is, the court having 
found the decision was wrong, it should not be enforced, “final and binding” or not under the main 
contract.  
 
Of course a proponent confronted with this argument will try to argue that in the case where the certifier 
has breached the certifier deed and there is a possible claim by the contractor against the certifier as a 
result, the contractor has the possibility of this claim and as a result the actual decision of the certifier 
should be considered “more” final and binding than would otherwise have been the case.  This is the 
reverse of the Marjorca Projects argument - that the situation now more closely resembles the Crouch 
situation and the intention of the parties more closely favours the conclusiveness of all certificates.  
 
The point is that in a public private partnership transaction, in relation to the one dispute there are two 
different dispute resolution processes under two separate deeds potentially with two different parties – a 
dispute as to the conclusiveness of the decision between the contractor and proponent and a dispute under 
the certifier deed between the aggrieved party and the certifier. In view of the potentially very different 
consequences, parties to them should be clearer about which disputes are to be resolved where, and what 
is the intended consequence for the construction contract (if any).  
 
 
 
5. Some drafting considerations  
Clarity in drafting is imperative. If the effect of the certificate is intended to be final and binding then the 
contract should make express provision for this.64 As the assessment of whether a decision is the exercise 
of discretion or mechanical is not an assessment which is easy to make in the context of highly technical 
construction contracts, providing expressly for this eventuality is appropriate. If this is not the contractual 
intention then this should be made clear. 
 
In relation to projects conducted as public private partnerships, it is essential that a consistent approach to 
the drafting of the main building contract and the independent certifier deed is undertaken. One solution 
has been to include a provision in the certifier deed that the parties agree to be bound by decisions under 
                                                            
64  Of course, the decision might still be impacted by Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s57 depending on how that 
provision is interpreted.  
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the main construction contract but the impact of such a provision and whether it is sufficient to overcome 
any perceived problem has yet to be tested in the courts. To avoid the difficulties produced by the 
operation of the certifier deed and the construction contract it may well be better to limit the dispute 
resolution processes under the certifier deed to the commercial aspects of the relationship of the parties to 
the certifier. This may minimize the risk that one deed may infect the other. 
 
Any exclusion clause included for the benefit of the certifier must be carefully considered taking into 
account the recent “more balanced approach” to interpretation of such clauses.65 The words used are to be 
construed according to their ordinary and natural meaning given the context in which the exclusion clause 
appears and taking into account the type and object of the contract. Of course if there is any ambiguity 
then the clause will be read against the proferens, in this case the certifier.66  
 
6. Conclusion 
The test as to whether a decision of a certifier is final and binding requires the resolution of the question 
what the parties intended when they made the contract. The role of the certifier in large projects can be 
very complex; the certifier does many different things. The hijacking of the test by a focus on the 
mechanical or discretionary nature of the decision making process makes the law in these situations 
unnecessarily technical (or even arguably too simplistic) and is the result of the peculiarity of the cases 
that have come before the courts. As a result of the complexity of many of these transactions and the role 
of the certifier, it also introduces a level of uncertainty into the deal.  To combat this, it is essential to 
ensure that contracts are drafted to make it plain what is the certifier’s role. Also, if the decision is not 
final and binding, the contract should make it clear who the dispute is with – the owner, contractor and/or 
certifier. This is important because a limitation of liability provision may impact on recovery from the 
certifier. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
65 JW Carter, Contract Law in Australia, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013, 6th ed), 289. 
66 Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500. 
